This paper presents the ﬁrst deep investigation of the kmem_cache facility in Linux from a forensics perspective. The kmem_cache is used by the Linux kernel to quickly allocate and deallocate kernel structures associated with processes, ﬁles, and the network stack. Our focus is on deallocated information that remains in the cache and the major contribution of this paper is to illustrate what forensically relevant information can be retrieved from the kmem_cache and what information is deﬁnitively not retrievable. We show that the kmem_cache contains a wealth of digital evidence, much of which was either previously unavailable or difﬁcult to obtain, requiring ad hoc methods for extraction. Previously executed processes, memory mappings, sent and received network packets, NAT translations, accessed ﬁle system inodes, and more can all be recovered through examination of the kmem_cache contents. We also discuss portable methods for erasing this information, to ensure that private data is no longer recoverable.